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  Decentralization is an on-going process with substantial repercussions at 
institutional, administrative and political level. It is a hotly debated issue in both 
developing and developed countries; it involves numerous policy-making areas, 
including rural development policy.  
  Given society’s interest in the issue of decentralization, it is of no surprise how 
much research has been done into the topic. University and research bodies have had 
their interests drawn by both the institutional-political and the economic-practical 
dimensions of the question. Interest has also been shown by many other bodies 
(governments, international organizations) which intended, through research, to 
document the need for decentralization and to seek effective ways in which to 
accomplish it. 
  This study aims at critically assessing the decentralization process of rural 
policy making and delivery in Greece within the new institutional and administrative 
setting.  
  The study comprises eight parts. In the first part some evidence from recent 
debate on decentralization are reviewed. Administrative decentralization in Greece 
and decentralization of agricultural and rural development policies is the subject of 
second and third sections, respectively. Next, critical aspects of the design and 
implementation of Investment Aid Scheme in Greek Agriculture are explored, 
followed by an exposition of the authorities participating in the scheme and their 
affiliation with it. The Case study approach is presented in the sixth section. Research 
findings and discussion follow; the study is completed with concluding remarks. 
 
Recent debate on decentralization: some basic evidence   
 
  There is a continually growing bibliography on various aspects of the 
decentralization process, especially pertaining to developing countries (for indicative 
reading, see: Eaton, 2001; Niksic, 2004; Andrews and Schroeder, 2003; Crook and 
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process have become manifest in the context of recent and ongoing research.      
  Some of these include: insufficient financial resources allocated to local 
communities and inadequate transfer of decision-making powers (Crook and Manor, 
1998; Wunsch, 2001), accountability problems (World Bank, 2001a; Edmiston, 
2002), use of decentralization as a strategy for increased territorial control rather than 
a means to promote local autonomy (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001), deficiencies in 
administrative and political organisation (Wunsch, 2001; Edmiston, 2002), regional 
endeavour inequities (Sonja, 1996; World Bank, 2000), appropriation of benefits by 
local elites (Wyckoff-Baird et al., 2001; Manor, 2002), and conflicts between central 
and local governments (Smoke and Lewis, 1996). Alternative explanations for 
decentralization’s failure to achieve its stated aims have also been suggested (Hadiz, 
2004). 
  In the case of European countries, the particular debate, apart from 
decentralization, also includes devolution as the granting of powers from central 
government to government at regional or local level, the concept of subsidiarity, 
which is mainly promoted by the official authorities of the European Union (EU), as 
well as the trend towards regionalization of the EU itself. These principles permeate 
the institutional framework of the EU to various degrees, as well as the policies that 
the EU implements. 
  In particular, devolution becomes discernible firstly, as the transfer of power 
to a subordinate elected body, secondly as the transfer of power on a geographical 
basis and thirdly, as the transfer of functions at present exercised by Parliament; in 
recent years, devolution has been in the spotlight within the context of the unitary 
states administrative reforms, such as those in the UK (Pearce et al. 2005, Walker and 
Boyne, 2006; ESRC, 2006; Hudson, 2006). 
  On the other hand, the principle of subsidiarity requires decision making at the 
lowest possible level which, within the context of a given political system, can 
facilitate effective action (EU, 2006a; Schilling, 1995). Subsidiarity became an 
acceptable constitutional tenet of the European Union with the Maastrich Treaty and 
was clarified at the European Commission summit in Birmingham in October 1992: 
‘Resolutions should be as closely aligned as possible to citizens’. On a European 
level, the principle attempts to restrict the undertaking of joint action only to those 
situations where it is necessary and advisable. On a national level, it encourages 
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local communities (EU, 2006b). 
  The appropriate level of subsidiarity is a question whose answer is only found 
in practice and depends on the size of the country, its resources, the number of 
administrative levels and the particular characteristics of its goods and services 
(Smith, 1997). 
  Decentralization is considered to be a process of administrative, political and 
fiscal dimensions. The usual practice of governments is to transfer all responsibilities 
except financial matters to lower administrative levels. One aspect of administrative 
decentralization which is of particular importance to this study is the transfer of 
responsibility of planning, financing and the management of specific public 
operations from the central government to local administrative units (World Bank 
2001b; Smith, 1997). 
 
Scepticism about the need for decentralization 
             
  Though fewer in number than the arguments in favour of decentralization, 
arguments against it have been put forward. As a rule, these are in the form of doubts 
about the potential dangers inherent in the transfer of power from the centre to the 
local level. The possible dangers can be summarised as follows (World Bank, 2001b): 
Firstly, the loss of economies of scale that a central administration can achieve. The 
repetition of similar procedures, spiralling transaction costs, since the splintering of 
resources is difficult to avoid. The problem is exacerbated when financial resources 
are limited and are not properly monitored when there are many decision making 
centres. 
  A second group of problems is connected with a low administrative and 
technical capacity which has been found to exist at the local level. Regional centres 
have difficulty in attracting highly skilled administrator, both in the public and private 
sectors, which creates unfavourable consequences in the planning and implementation 
of effective programs. Decentralization can also lead to difficulties in co-ordinating 
the realization of national policy. The high number of people involved will naturally 
lead to inadequate communication which hinders the acquisition of a uniform 
consciousness and attitude towards national priorities. 
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of the local administrative system is a serious danger that can change the outcome of 
the attempt to bolster democracy. This attempt is an integral part of all the 
decentralization reforms. This phenomenon is not uncommon in small communities 
where relationships and ‘counterbalances’ that are not ethical are often accepted. 
  Lucchese (2000), looking at the issue from a political standpoint, is sceptical 
about the general trend towards regionalization that the European Union is taking, and 
generally about the ‘vision’ of a ‘Europe of regions’. She is dubious about the view 
that regions can provide the basis for an institutional convergence among the member 
states of the Union and that they can contribute to a complete European integration. 
Her view is that regionalization cannot, on its own, produce the benefits that are 
attributed to it, without an analysis of the conditions from which these originate. In 
addition, appropriate solutions need to be found for programming demands and the 
management of EU funds. She points out that regionalization should not be viewed as 
a genuine political goal because it lays emphasis on local differences and constitutes a 
withdrawal from those states whose fabric is based on civil society to the nation-states 
of the past.      
 
Administrative decentralization in Greece 
 
  The issue of decentralization particularly interested Greek scholars during the 
great administrative reforms of the 1980’s and 1990’s. In particular, 13 administrative 
regions were set up in 1986, a self-administration prefecture was established in 1994 
(whereby Prefects were now elected, rather than appointed), while in 1997, first order 
Local Municipalities were amalgamated and had their roles upgraded. 
  Scholarly debate focussed mainly on the following topics: firstly, the 
prospects for second order (prefecture) self-administration and, secondly, how the 
administrative reforms would tie in with the overall goal of regional development. It 
was reasonable that the issue of prefecture self-administration and its future would be 
the focal point, given its ‘long gestation period’
1. The expectations it raised extend to 
three levels: institutional, political and organisational (Spanou et al., 1997). 
                                                 
1 See Makrydimitris (1997) for a brief history of the attempts at forming and operating this institution 
in 1887, 1899, 1923, 1986 and 1990, until its final implementation in 1994.  
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administration is placed within the overall constitutional structure. The challenge that 
it faces as a new institution concerns its relations that it will develop with other 
administrative and self-administrative bodies. These relations are not simply a result 
of an official distribution of responsibilities. Prefecture self-administration must 
prevail in its own sphere of intervention. The question is whether the institutionalised 
relations with other levels will prove to be ones of complementarity and synergy or 
ones of competition and conflict. 
  On a political level, prefecture self-administration means the introduction of 
pluralism. The way in which this new sphere of political competition will be 
integrated into the general political structure is a matter that is in progress. The 
interaction that it will develop with the social environment and the way in which it 
will intervene in the traditional articulation of social interests within the political 
system will be a source of research for quite a while. 
  As far as the organizational level is concerned, prefecture self-administration 
is an outward looking institution par excellence, which replaces, and in fact, with an 
expanded role, the central government’s administrative presence in the prefecture. 
The challenge that it faces concerns the effectiveness with which it will respond to 
local needs, developmental needs and others. What is at stake is the prefecture self-
administration’s own legitimating basis. 
  It is worth noting that most scholars are not optimistic about the future of 
prefecture self-administration. They regard its institutional framework as inadequate. 
They also see that political parties waver in their support of it and that the centralized 
attitude of central administration will hinder its development (Christophilopoulou, 
1996).   
  Scholars also believe that the range within which prefecture self-
administration operates was confined by the reform that lead to its establishment. 
Prefectures were transformed from primary institutions of decentralization to second 
order self-administration. Public policy for the re-planning of the administrative 
system seems to have been more symbolic in character, rather than actually aiming to 
reform the relations between central services and self-administrative organizations 
(Michalopoulos, 1997). Moreover, when referring to the political attraction of the new 
institution, Makrydimitris (1997) discovers that: 
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Members of Parliament and mayors, the prefect’s executive powers are 
subject to multiple restrictions. This fact, combined with the ignorance 
about the actual potential and significance of the institution, has rendered 
the prefect less attractive, both among first order candidates, and with the 
electorate, who expresses this through indifference, as it does not know what 
exactly what is at stake’ (p.81). 
 
  The second round of talks on administrative reforms, in other words, the 
linkage between these reforms and the goal of regional development, also do not give 
rise to optimism. According to scholars, the new institutions have turned out, in 
practice, to be ineffective because they have insufficient resources at their disposal 
and operate according to Greek public administration lines: centralization, party 
politicisation, authoritarianism, formalism, bureaucracy, administrative backwardness 
and irrationalism (Litsos, 1997). They also regenerate the central administration’s 
inability in developmental planning, relegating local programs to a list of works 
which lack cohesion and long term strategic choices (Christophilopoulou, 1996). 
Consequently, although one of the pre-conditions for the effective formulation and 
implementation of local development, that is, the institutional framework,  appears to 
have been met, there are still inadequacies which impede endogenous development: 
inadequacies in resources and infrastructure and the absence of local decision making 
bodies which, within the framework of a continual process of social consensus and 
co-operation, would otherwise take initiatives in the planning and realization of local 
development. 
  It must, nevertheless, be noted that the empirical documentation of the Greek 
bibliography mentioned above is almost non-existent.   
  After prefecture self-administration was established in 1994, a series of 
prefecture services, which up until that time had depended directly on the central 
government (one of these being the Prefecture Agricultural Development Directorate) 
became part of prefecture self-administration. However, serious problems over the 
separation of responsibilities at each level arose, which eventually lead to a minor 
amendment to the constitution in 2001, as well as to notable legislation passed by the 
Council of State relating to the distinction and, mainly, the transfer of responsibilities 
from the central government to prefecture self-administration. Within this framework, 
  6a re-allocation of responsibilities from prefecture to central government level has been 
noted in recent years (Getimis et al., 2005). 
  This tendency of withdrawal and reversal of the decentralization process is 
significantly influenced by the aforementioned legal opinions on the one hand, and by 
the intense opposition exerted by certain powerful professional groups involved in the 
decentralization process, and in particular at the prefecture level. Theses groups have 
been nurtured for many years on the assumption that they are dependent on the 
respective Ministry (‘their’ Ministry) and so they object to being transferred to the 
auspices of prefecture self-administration. Such examples of these professional groups 
are teachers and the Ministry of Education, engineers and the Ministry of the 
Environment and Country Planning and agriculturalists and the Ministry of Rural 
Development and Food (MRDF), previously called the Ministry of Agriculture.   
 
Decentralization of agricultural and rural development policies 
 
  The developments that have been made in the philosophy and content of the 
Common Agricultural Policy, especially after the early 1990’s are most significant. 
Emphasis is continually leaning towards the structural and environmental component 
and away from the supporting of agricultural product prices. Consequently, within the 
framework of the ‘Second Pillar’ of the CAP which concerns rural development, the 
spatial and diversified approach is being favoured. Decentralization is considered to 
be one of the basic features of this approach, which ‘would enable the member-states 
to better pinpoint local needs and bring agricultural policy closer to consumers. … 
rural development would especially offer a particular local (spatial) dimension.’ (EC, 
2002). Within this framework, agreements and subsidizations from both the European 
and local level have multiplied. 
  The regionalization of the EU’s agricultural policies has been another 
important development. Perraud (1995) believes that, if we want to study the way in 
which policy has been formed, it is necessary the level of the region in our research, 
because a) regions now include authorities which create policy, given that they 
produce programs, rules, regulations and subsidizations, b) regions do not repeat 
national policy but, instead, carve out their own policies which are distinguishable 
from national policy in operation, content and, sometimes, strategic direction and c) 
regions are increasingly participating in the public financing of agriculture. The 
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homogenous agricultural policy on the one hand, and from the need to respond to the 
distinct features of the rural regions on the other. 
  The administrative level that enables a flexible and diversified application of 
agricultural policy is the regional one. On the other hand of course, multiple layers of 
policy also means multiple inconsistencies connected with means and financial 
resources. There are dangers, however, that can thwart the whole decentralization 
process. These are: a) many regions that do not have the necessary means with which 
to regulate their agriculture – usually infrastructure, b) regions that have a few 
responsibilities but have neither experience nor means, c) a lack of financial resources 
and d) regions that confine themselves to representing local interests on a central level 
(lobbying). 
  According to Trouve (2004), regions comprise a basic component within the 
workings of decentralization: common policies obviously include a certain amount of 
‘regionalization’ which concern the transfer of responsibilities and economic 
resources. Regions acquire new responsibilities with which to finance, elaborate and 
apply agricultural policies, thereby showcasing certain regional policies through their 
own strategies. This happens in regions which have formidable authority and so can 
develop their own policies, eg. in Italy, as well as regions that do not have their own 
authority, as in France. Comparisons among European regions show that such 
workings appear to be heterogeneous and uncertain. However, they are adequate 
enough to bring about an increase in research into regional agricultural policies. 
  
In the case of Greece, decentralization of rural development policies is of particular 
importance.  This process should be viewed within the context that was formed 
recently as a result of two major developments, which, when combined, significantly 
influence the outcome of agricultural development policies. The first of these was 
administrative reform, which established administrative regions in 1986 and 
Prefecture Self-administration in 1994. The second development was the 
implementation of the institutional framework of the European Union’s for rural 
development and the reforms of Structural Funds, which is constantly developing and 
improving. The former issue is directly related to the number of bodies involved, and 
to the establishment of new bodies and the subsequent allocation of responsibilities. 
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the implementation of the Community Support Frameworks
2 (CSF’s). 
  In the context of CSF’s, rural development, regional development and 
environmental policies of the EU are structurally placed into a single development 
planning. This single planning, particularly prominent in Objective 1 regions, contains 
a strong spatial element, which operates de facto in a decentralized way, both in its 
administrative and financial dimensions. It does this administratively because it 
introduces totally new principles in the case of centralized states, like Greece. It is a 
de facto significant driving force towards overall decentralization. It also assumes 
great economic importance, since the serious macro-economic restrictions mean that 
programs co-financed by the EU represent the overwhelmingly greatest part of the 
public investments. This decentralized dimension mainly concerns application, and, to 
a lesser degree, the design of policies. 
 
Investment Aid Scheme in Greek Agriculture 
 
  The bolstering of private agricultural investments forms one of the most 
important political measures which aim to modernise farm structures and to re-
organize the agricultural sector of all the EU countries. Through the Investment Aid 
Scheme (cited as ‘scheme’ from now on), more specialized aims, have been promoted 
too; these include the agri-environmental incentives, (EC, 1985; IEEP, 1993) in 
various European countries, as well as the ‘contrats territoriaux d’exploitation’ in 
France, within the framework of multifunctionality (Coleman and Chiasson, 2002). 
From 1988 onwards, the scheme constituted an inseparable part of the policies 
exercised through the Structural Funds, thus fulfilling cohesion objectives as well. 
Since 1999, when Regulation 1257/99 was officially announced, private investment 
aid to agriculture has been structurally integrated into the overall EU rural 
development policy (EC, 1999). The real improvement of the efficiency of farm 
structures within the scheme is pursued through submission and approval of a detailed 
Investment Plan (IP), also known as ‘Improvement Plan’ (EC 1972; 1975). 
                                                 
2 Greece became a member of the EU in 1981. Since the late 1980’s, three wide-ranging development 
programs have been implemented in the country, jointly funded by the EU Structural Funds. These 
programs are also known as ‘Community Support Frameworks’ (CSF), each corresponding to a 
programming period: 1
st CSF (1989-1993), 2
nd CSF (1994-1999), 3
rd CSF (2000-2006). 
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member-states the ability to choose a desirable set of priorities (Tracy, 1993). In the 
case of Greece, investments that were made under the scheme undoubtedly had 
beneficial effects for the farms that carried them out. Nevertheless, they all operated 
strictly within the framework of the ‘modernization’ paradigm (mechanization-
irrigation). Farms that benefited had the opportunity to proceed with radical re-
organization of their production, while at the same time new job positions were 
created (Tsiboukas et al, 2000). 
  Undoubtedly, the scheme has substantially contributed to a series of 
improvements in Greek agriculture. For example, up until 1999, one quarter of 
eligible farms had joined the scheme. The scheme’s contribution to the overall 
cohesion and structural policies has been most significant. Farm Investment Aid is 
one of the foundations upon which all the vast development programs that have been 
implemented in Greece since the end of the 1980’s (known as Community Support 
Frameworks or CSF’s) have been built. The scheme is the most significant act of the 
Rural Development Operational Program (RDOP), which has been an integral part of 
all the CSF’s up until today, and is implemented by the Ministry of Rural 
Development and Food (MRDF). 
 
Policy making and delivery of the scheme up to the second programming period 
 
  A careful examination of the policy-making and delivery of the scheme in 
relation to Structural Funds policies up until the second programming period uncovers 
a number of serious problems. Of these, the most significant are serious planning 
deficiencies, the absence of a clear programme rationale, as well as the absence of 
clear functional, sectoral and geographic priorities, thus making an integrated and 
comprehensive evaluation of the scheme impossible (Karanikolas and Martinos, 
forthcoming). 
  The two ‘poles’ of the whole system were the Minister of Agriculture on the 
one hand, who had the exclusive authority for the distribution of monetary resources, 
and the Prefect and certain members of the Prefecture Rural Development 
Directorates (PrRDD’s) on the other. The latter, in reality, were accountable to noone, 
as they had the exclusive responsibility for the briefing, receipt and monitoring of the 
submitted IP’s. However, the framework for the implementation of the scheme 
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vagueness and arbitrary actions - including corruption - on the part of the engaged 
scientific and technical personnel employed in the PrRDD’s (Papadopoulos, 1997). 
Another substantive characteristic of the scheme was its exclusive state-emanated 
design and implementation, in a totally centralized logic, with the absence of another 
social partner, particularly the farm organizations’ representatives. 
  Within the above context, the problem of burdening the program during each 
programming period with tasks deriving from legal obligations contracted during the 
previous period is a characteristic feature. This was an outcome of the decision to 
continue approval of IP’s after the program’s resources had been exhausted 
throughout the second half of 1999, leading the entire program into serious fiscal 
imbalance and related programming errors. However, the most serious consequence 
was the severe undermining of any possibility for continuation of the same policy 
measure in the third programming period: though approximately 34,000 IP’s were 
accomplished during the second programming period, the target for the third 
programming period is 23,500 IP’s. These ‘previous commitments’ represent 41% of 
the IP’s which are going to be completed in the third programming period, and 27% 
of the respective public spending budget (186 billion euro out of 681 billion euro). 
Apart from the serious consequences to the entire programming process and the very 
high financial cost, these commitments incurred a corresponding administrative cost, 
as it took two years to clear up the situation from this phenomenon (number of 
beneficiaries, the payment of subsidised investments to those beneficiaries, etc.) 
 
Modifications from the second to the third Programming Period 
 
  The findings referred to above, as well as the development in the institutional 
framework for structural policies and rural development (Regulations (EC)1257/99 
and 1260/99), bear out noteworthy modifications to the scheme’s policy design and 
implementation. Great effort was made by the MRDF to rationalize and reform the 
entire system in the third programming period. The scheme is implemented both on a 
central, and regional level, with the total number of IP’s equally divided between the 
two. The central level, through the national RDOP, is concerned with animal 
production IP’s, while the regional level, through the Regional Operational Programs 
(RegOP’s), is concerned with crop production IP’s. 
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responsibilities, are also of significance. The ‘absolute’ authority once exercised by 
personnel employed in the PrDD’s has now been replaced by dispersed and multiple 
authorities, with more stakeholders. In addition, approval of IP’s is no longer given by 
the Prefect, but by either the Minister of Rural Development and Food (for animal 
production IP’s), or the General Secretary of the respective region (for crop 
production IP’s). Also, the non-existence of criteria prioritising the potential 
beneficiaries has given way to a system which grades and classifies them into 
recipients, runners-up and rejects. 
  It is hoped that the above changes will make the whole process more 
transparent, more objective and more efficient. 
 
Participants in the scheme and their affiliation with it 
 
  There are six principal bodies involved in the planning and implementation of 
the scheme, emanating from all the administrative levels. Two of these come from the 
central level, the Managing Authority of Rural Development Operational Program 
(RDOP’s MA) and another service which was established especially for the 
management and implementation of the scheme, called Rural Development 
Operational Program’s Special Management Unit (RDOP’s SMU), acting also as the 
final beneficiary of the scheme. Two other bodies from the regional level also actively 
participate. These are the Managing Authority of Regional Operational Programs 
(RegOP’s MA) and the Regional Rural Development Directorate (RegRDD). The 
Prefecture Rural Development Directorate (PrRDD) continues its involvement with 
specific responsibilities, as do the Local Municipalities (LM’s). Moreover, the 
Minister of Rural Development and Food, as well as the General Secretaries of the 
Regions have particularly defined roles within the whole system. 
  The responsibilities, grouped into ten different categories, and the roles of the 
participants in relation to the scheme, are shown in Table 1. As is shown in Table 1, 
although the responsibilities are spread over eight different bodies, the system in 
reality is exceptionally centralized, given that the Minister of Rural Development and 
Food has the exclusive authority for strategic planning, and for the two other arbiter 
responsibilities (distribution of resources and approval of IP’s), which are also exerted 
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levels accumulate the fewest responsibilities of all. 
  It should be noted that the RDOP’s MA and the RDOP’s SMU have the same 
director, even though Regulation 1260/99 states otherwise. The operation of the entire 
system presupposes a sequence of actions which is shown in diagram 1 (see Annex). 
 
Case study approach 
 
  From our analysis so far it follows that in the field of rural policy making and 
implementation significant developments are taking place, which create an entirely 
new setting. These developments relate to the decentralization process of national 
administrative systems, to the continuous evolution of structural policies in the EU 
and to the increasing reinforcement of the second Pillar of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). Thus, responsibilities are devolved in favour of lower administrative 
levels; policies become more complicated in terms of content and require the 
involvement of more authorities than was previously the case; new authorities are 
established and responsibility is redistributed among them; rural development policy 
moves from uniformity to diversification and serious effort is taken to make it 
respond to the specific needs of regions and the demands of European societies.  
  The abovementioned issues provide the context for our assessment of the 
decentralization process of rural development policy in Greece, which is pursued 
through a case study of the farm investment aid scheme. The selection of the 
particular policy measure is justified on the one hand by its importance within farm 
structural policy and rural development policy and on the other hand because its 
planning and implementation take place across all administrative levels, with the 
participation in the process of all new mechanisms that have been recently 
established. Our research included all the authorities that are involved in that part of 
the scheme that deals with animal production IPs (i.e. almost half the total number of 
IPs), because in that part all administrative levels are represented.  
More specifically, our aim is:  
First, to assess the effectiveness of the decentralization process, within the new 
institutional and administrative setting of the scheme.  
Second, to identify stakeholders’ perceptions for both the decentralization process of 
the scheme and the desirable priorities for rural development policy. 
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and the administrative practice regarding the issues at hand. At the same time, we 
conducted a research through questionnaires addressed to the authorities that are 
involved in the scheme at all administrative levels. The research took place from 
January through April 2006. Target populations, number of questionnaires addressed 
to each authority and response rates are presented in Table 2. The response rate ranges 
from 46% to 64%, the average being 51%, which is deemed absolutely satisfactory.  
 
Research findings – Discussion  
 
The struggling and contradictory process of decentralization of rural policy  
 
  The Greek State started, in the 1980s, a significant reform effort with a view to 
modernising and democratising its organization and administration. Within this 
framework, the new shape of government of the Greek State, based on the idea of 
decentralization, was gradually established. Following the establishment of new 
administrative levels, responsibility was delegated to lower tiers, whereas at the same 
time the procedures of “Democratic Programming” and “Social Consultation” were 
introduced into the development planning process of the country.  
 Nevertheless,  whether  decentralization intentions and plans were actually 
fulfilled and led to the desired benefits remains to be explored. The research that was 
conducted within the present study does not seem to support the view that the aims 
have been achieved. On the contrary, it seems to lend its support to the view that 
decentralization has not been completed (Getimis et al., 2005).  
  Regional Administration and Local self-Administration of the A´ and B´ 
Degree were given responsibility for development planning at their respective levels, 
as well as for providing input thereof for national planning. In practice, however, they 
are assigned tasks of a merely implementation nature – which is especially true for 
Local self-Administration. As a result, Local self-Administration of the B´ Degree (at 
the Prefecture level) has not yet found its place and role within the administration 
system of the state.  
  The fact that the organizational structure of regional administration was 
designed by the central government, and set by Law, so as to make it uniform, 
although that does not seem to respond to their actual needs (Koumoukelli and 
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State. At the Prefecture level of Local self-Administration, although the new 
organizational structure was decided upon by the Prefectural Council, it was based on 
the service units that existed previously, when Prefectures were units of central 
government. Therefore, the structure of all level B´ Local self-Administration is 
uniform as well and organization is not used as a tool to achieve better results.  
  Administration levels were separated without providing for multilateral 
communication between them, within the spirit of constructive cooperation for the 
achievement of common goals. The findings of our research indicate that 
communication is unilateral and one-dimensional, from the center to lower levels of 
administration. The Prefecture Directorate of Agriculture (now Prefecture Rural 
Development Directorate) is no longer a Service of the Ministry in a single vertical 
thematic administration. Officially it has achieved its independence from the MRDF, 
but this disconnection brought about only disadvantages and none of the potential 
merits. All rural development actions are designed centrally, by the Ministry, without 
input from Regional Rural Development Directorates nor the Prefecture Rural 
Development Directorates. The responsibilities of these two units within the 
framework of rural development schemes relate to implementation only. Some 
respondents termed it as “simple paper-pushing”.  
 Development  directions  and national planning are, beyond doubt, a task of the 
central administration. However, both the principles of “Democratic Programming” 
and the requirements of effectiveness (arguments that, as we saw, underpin the idea of 
decentralization), demand good knowledge of facts, views and needs at local level.   
  The absence of substantial contribution, through a process of continuous 
communication, in the formulation of rural development policy becomes evident, 
also, in the proposals of all administrative levels (except that of the central 
government) for a) an increase of contacts with Central Services and b) the creation of 
a coordination mechanism, as necessary changes in the institutional framework.    
  Lower administrative levels are, therefore, called to carry out a task that is 
assigned to them by the Ministry; however, they have no channel of communication 
with it, nor any access to it that would allow them to influence decisions which affect 
them directly. It is true that the institutional framework provides for social 
consultation; however, it does not provide for intra-service consultations either at the 
stage of planning or at that of implementation. Communication is top-down, from 
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amounts to sheer –and rather limited- provision of information, or to the provision of 
guidelines regarding the execution of preset procedures. This conclusion is drawn also 
from the proposals that were put forth by the Managing Authorities of Regional 
Operational Programs for the improved implementation of schemes, but also from the 
wish of Prefecture Rural Development Directorates to express their opinion on the 
draft common ministerial decisions on the implementation of schemes in which they 
are intended to be involved.  
  The procedure for the approval – monitoring of implementation – certification 
of completion of IPs is an example of decentralized implementation where all 
administrative levels are involved. The procedure provides for a role for each 
administrative level, however, as we move towards lower levels, this role is confined 
to mere execution duties. Therefore, whereas apparently we have a decentralized 
implementation procedure, in fact it is absolutely concentrated, given that the final 
decision for approval is made by the Minister of RDF. It is decentralization in name 
only, as responsibility for decision-making is not devolved to lower levels of 
government – which would be the requirement to call it decentralized.  
  Referring to the delegation of decision-making powers to lower levels of 
administration, what we see is a reversal compared to the similar procedure of the 2
nd 
CSF, where the final decision for the approval of IPs was made by the Prefect. In the 
3
nd CSF a more concentrated procedure was established, because, according to 
comments made by respondents, instances of lack of integrity were observed. The 
reaction, then, of the central administration to the suspicion of non ethical 
implementation of the procedure was to deprive lower levels of government from 
decision-making responsibility. Moreover, Central Government tried to install a 
system to ensure integrity and quality throughout the procedure; however, eventually 
it did not trust this system, given that the Central Administration, namely the Rural 
Development Operational Program’s Special Management Unit, which was the final 
beneficiary for the Measure of IPs, proceeded to a new checking of all candidate files. 
The purpose of this re-checking was to verify the validity and completeness of 
candidate files. The result, however, of this additional check, which included all data 
(even those that had been checked by other authorities) were long delays in the final 
approval of IPs and large administrative costs.  
  16     At this point we should mention that requirements regarding candidate files 
are particularly high
3, without, however, due information to interested parties, as to 
their completion, nor to assessors, as to how to check them. The new common 
ministerial decision 637/05 (article 22) for the implementation of IPs, which shall 
apply henceforth, stipulates that the final beneficiary will draft the proposal to the 
Minister for the approval of IPs according to the verdict of the Advisory Committee 
without performing a new check of candidate files. However, the procedure remains 
concentrated, given that the final decision for approval rests with the Minister.  
  One of the arguments for decentralized administration is the improvement of 
public management in general, or of a specific procedure in particular, since such an 
arrangement allows the central administration to focus on its planning duties, relieved 
from execution tasks. The procedure for the implementation of IPs obviously 
provided for the involvement of all administrative levels in order, on the one hand, to 
save resources from the central administration and, on the other hand, to render the 
procedure more effective and efficient. However, the research findings suggest that 
the effectiveness of the procedure is in question. There has been an effort to 
rationalize and introduce objective criteria, but at the same time long delays and 
increased administrative costs are noticed. Therefore, it is questionable whether 
eventually the system is more effective.  
  To conclude, we would like to return to the remarks that were made earlier 
concerning the lack of a planning rationale in the design and implementation of the 
scheme, as well as to the serious shortcomings in programming. These remarks create 
reasonable questions regarding the general development contribution of this highly 
important policy measure.   
 
Stakeholders’ assessment of scheme’s decentralization process 
 
  From the answers given to the questions of the research by those directly 
involved in the planning and implementation of the scheme, a set of interesting 
opinions ensue (see Annex Α).  
                                                 
3 According to some respondents from the country, these requirements are even higher than those that 
apply, for instance, to the aid to the secondary sector (processing and marketing of agricultural 
products).   
  17  There is considerable consensus among authorities on the fact that the 
procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd programming period is 
more transparent but also more bureaucratic than that of the 2
nd programming period.  
Less strong, but still evident is the agreement among authorities on the following 
issues:  
•  The procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans is largely bureaucratic 
and time-consuming (4 out of 5 authorities). Only the RDOP’s SMU finds it 
complicated but necessary. No one finds it relatively simple and effective.  
•  The procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans in the 3
rd CSF is more 
objective in terms of the assessment criteria it sets in comparison to the one of 
the 2
nd CSF (all find it more objective, with the exception of the RDOP’s MA, 
where answers are evenly distributed between Yes and No). 
 
However, we also have diverging views in a number of issues:  
•  the quality of coordination between authorities that take part in the procedure 
for the approval of proposals/projects of Improvement Plans 
•  the extend to which the time schedules that were set for the procedures of 
advertising, submission of proposals, approval, monitoring and delivery of 
Improvement Plans were kept 
•  whether the procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd CSF is 
more effective in terms of meeting the needs of the farm sector in comparison 
to the one of the 2
nd CSF.  
 
  On the whole, although a procedure was established that the stakeholders 
unanimously perceive as more complicated, more bureaucratic but more transparent 
in comparison to the one of the 2
nd programming period, views about its relative 
effectiveness and the degree to which it responds to the needs of the sector are 
skeptical.  
 
The views about rural policy 
 
  The views among authorities about rural development policy in general are 
very interesting (see Annex B). They largely agree that the existing institutional 
  18framework does not provide them with sufficient opportunities to participate in the 
formulation of rural policy. However, although the institutional framework is 
confining, three out of five authorities feel that, in the end, they do participate in 
policy-making in the sector at hand. More specifically, the two authorities of the 
centre and a regional one (the Regional Operational Programs’ Managing Authorities) 
believe that they have a role in the formulation of policy – in contrast to the Regional 
Rural Development Directorates and the Prefecture Rural Development Directorates.  
  It is “reasonable”, perhaps, to expect that the two authorities of the centre feel 
that they take part: both the origin of many of their staff members (the headquarters of 
the MRDF), and their nation-wide responsibilities can account for their views. It is 
worth noticing, however, how the two authorities of the regional level have differing 
views, showing moreover the widest divergence between all authorities. On the one 
hand the RegOP’s MA, where almost 90% of staff believe they participate in policy-
making and on the other hand the RegRDD, where only 30% of staff has this view. 
The active involvement of RegOP’s MA staff in the design of development programs 
at regional level, as well as their advisory role in committees and work groups may be 
giving them the sense of participation. A further reason is their direct involvement in 
Regional Operational Programs, i.e. in multi-sector programs with a wide range of 
thematic fields, in contrast with RegRDD, which have a more sector-specific 
orientation.     
  The other authority that feels that it does not participate in policy-making is 
the PrefRDDs, i.e. the authorities that during the previous programming period had a 
decisive role in a number of rural policy affairs. It is understood that they are going 
through a stage where their role within the new environment is being redefined. 
Perhaps the most basic element of their identity is their preference to constitute part of 
the administrative machine of the MRDF, which is the status they had before the 
establishment of the 2
nd degree of local self-government.  
  Finally, all the authorities that took part in the research expressed a strong 
desire for active involvement in the defining of goals and priorities for rural policy at 
their administrative level.  
   
The priorities of rural development policy  
 
  19  As expected, the ranking of priorities in rural development policy presents 
varying degrees of differentiation among authorities (table 3). The highest-ranking 
goals are the development of quality products, the implementation of the Codes of 
Good Agricultural Practice and Cross-Compliance. These are followed by the 
reinforcement of organic farming and organic stock-breeding. At the lowest ranks we 
see the diversification of production towards non-edible products and the 
development of fisheries.  
  Regarding the comparison between authorities, the RDOP’s MA, the RDOP’s 
SMU and the RegOP’s MAs show a high degree of internal convergence in their 
views, whereas RegRDD follows a similar pattern. It is worth noticing the divergence 
of PrefRDDs from the other authorities in 12 out of 17 rural development policy 
priorities, i.e. they give lower rankings to 70% of the issues about which they were 
asked. It is remarkable how PrefRDDs rank lower than all other authorities the spatial 
approach to rural development policy, as opposed to the horizontal one. This is a clear 
indication of the readiness of the staff of PrefRDDs to respond to the demand for 
policies adapted to local needs.   
  Last, we see that the two authorities that have exactly the same categories of 
responsibilities, the RDOP’s MA and RegOP’s MA (table 1), follow a similar pattern 




  Rural policy-making in Greece is undergoing significant modifications 
emanating from recent efforts for devolution of competences, in relation to evolving 
EU structural policies and the ‘Second Pillar’ of Common Agricultural Policy. 
Nevertheless, this is a contradictory process, with innovative efforts in policy design 
and delivery as well as reversal of already activated procedures.   
  The redistribution of tasks and the mere multiplication of authorities 
responsible for the design and implementation of rural development policy do not 
necessarily advance the policy outcomes. What is needed as well is a genuine 
delegation of responsibilities and resources, coupled with a renewed awareness of 
integrated policies from the actors involved at all administrative levels.         
  Though notable decentralization efforts are in progress, rural development in 
Greece seems to maintain its primarily state-emanated design and implementation, in 
  20a centralized logic, as the case of farm investment aid scheme indicates. Long 
standing top-down and sectoral orientation in the formulation of this policy still holds, 
permeating the attitude of a number of actors, whose traditional role is challenged in 
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 Table 1: Allocation of Investment Aid Scheme's Responsibilities by Administrative Level (2003) 
 
Administrative Level  















MA  RegRDD PrRDD    LM's
1  Decisive Responsibilities for Strategic 
Planning   √                      
2  Financial Management        √        √       
3  Checking     √  √     √        √ 
4  Imposing Sanctions  √        √             
5  Advisory Function     √  √     √  √  √  √ 
6  Decisive Responsibilities for 
Financial Resource Allocation  √        √             
7  Administrative Support                  √  √    
8  Decisive Responsibilities for the 
Approval of Improvement Plans  √        √             
9  Responsibility for Regulating Matters 
of a General Character   √        √             
10  Responsibity for Providing 
Information     √  √     √  √       
 
RDOP’s MA: the Managing Authority of Rural Development Operational Program 
RDOP’s SMU: Rural Development Operational Program’s Special Management Unit 
RegOP’s MA: the Managing Authority of Regional Operational Programs 
PrRDD: the Prefecture Rural Development Directorate 
RegRDD: the Regional Rural Development Directorate 
LM’s: Local Municipalities    
 

































9  (7/13) = 
54% 





7  (6/13) = 
46% 





40  (27/54) = 
50% 
Total  82  42     69  51% 
 
 
NOTE: The response rate is calculated according to the way the questionnaire was filled-in,  










Table 3: Ranking of Priorities for Rural Development Policy 
 
RANKING BY ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL (Max. = 10) 
Central     Regional Prefecture
  
PRIORITIES 
RDOP’s MA  RDOP’s 
SMU  RegOP’s MA  RegRDD  PrRDD 
1    Restructuring  of  Cultivations 5  8  8  7    6
2  Reinforcing the Entrepreneurial Nature of Farms  8  9  9  8    6
3  Expansion of Irrigated Land  6         4 5 5 5
4  Expansion of Pastures and Development of Livestock Production  7  7  7  5    5
5  Development of Fisheries  6  7  6  6    3
6  Development of Agro-tourism  7  8  7  7    5
7 
Support for the Implementation of the Code of Good Agriculture 
Practices and the Cross Compliance Standards 
8  9  9  9    7
8 
Support for the Provision of Services of Environmental Protection by 
Farms 
9  8  8  8    6
9  Maintainance of Agricultural Heritage  8  6  9  6    5
10  Support to Organic Farming   9  8  8  8    7
11  Support to Organic Stock-Breeding  9  9  8  8    7
12 
Support for the Development of Quality Products (e.g. Products of 
Protected Designation of Origin) 
9  10  9  8    7
13 
Support for the Diversification of Agricultural Production towards 
Non-edible Products (e.g. Energy Plants, Pharmaceutical Plants) 
7  7  7  5    2
14  Support for the Diminishing of the Abandonment of Agricultural Land  2  7  6  7    4
15  Finding New Markets and Promoting the Products of the Region  9  8  9  7    5
16  Establishment of Processing Units for Agricultural Products  8         6 8 8 7
17 
Region-specific (spatial) rather than National Horizontal Approach to 
Rural Development 
10         8 8 6 4
 ANNEX  
Stakeholders’ Perception on Decentralization Process of Rural Policy 
 
A. In Relation to Investment Aid Scheme 
 
1.  The quality of coordination between authorities that participate in the procedure for the 


























2.  Have the time schedules set for the procedures of advertising, submission of proposals, 














































































































4. Is the procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd programming period more 
transparent in comparison to that of the 2



















































  285. Is the procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd programming period more 
bureaucratic in comparison to that of the 2


















































6. Is the procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd programming period more 
objective as to assessment criteria compared to that of the 2



























































  297. Is the procedure for the approval of Improvement Plans of the 3
rd programming period more 





























































B. In Relation to the Overall Rural Development Policy 
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9.  Does the existing institutional framework provide you with sufficient opportunities to 
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